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Free thinking, free thinking about free thinking (and so
on) in the free city of Christiania
The CADILLAC workshop was a logic workshop organized by the Technical Uni-
versity of Denmark and CIBS, University of Copenhagen. It consisted of three days
of continuous discourse on the logics of social interactions as well as social intera-
ctions amongst continuously discoursing logicians. The workshop took place at a for-
mer movie theatre ‘Byens Lys’ (Danish: The Light of Town) in the free city of Christi-
ania, Denmark, this bohemian backdrop providing an unusual and cozy atmosphere in
which academic discussion could easily thrive. The three keynote talks by Sonja Smets,
newly appointed director and professor at the ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Rine-
ke Verbrugge, professor of logic and cognition at the University of Groningen, and
Patrick Blackburn, professor of philosophy at Roskilde University, highlighted three
equally important aspects of the scientific enterprise: novel scientific insight of the hig-
hest quality (Smets), Public outreach at an engaging, entertaining and informative level
(Verbrugge) and innovative visions for the future of the field (Blackburn). Here I will
limit myself to commenting on Blackburn’s talk which took place at the third day of
the workshop, May 25, 2016.
Patrick Blackburn, ‘The new Trivium’
Patrick Blackburn’s talk was partly about teaching logic to humanities students, par-
ticularly at a university such as Roskilde, where the education is based upon student
led projects. There are temporal constraints as well as initial mental barriers and habits
among students to be encountered when attempting such a thing. Blackburn’s project
seems to be to get humanities students to think critically about critical thinking using
logic and formal modeling as both a tool and a medium; the latter Blackburn referred
to as conceptual cartooning. However, more importantly (to me1) the talk was about
where logic has gone the past decades and where it might go in the future. Blackburn
tells a story in which the protagonist, logic, starts out from the humanities, in particular
1This cautionary qualification can be applied anywhere in this text, however, grammaticality and com-
prehension may get disrupted depending on where and how often you actually do apply it.
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philosophy, explores areas of mathematics, computer science and, recently, the social
sciences, and now may return to its home in the humanities, seeking new insights and
further areas to explore. Thus, it is really a classical fairy tale with the hero starting
at home, venturing out to explore the world, and in the end returning home again. We
might see the beginning of this home coming trend in what van Benthem dubbed "the
cognitive turn", where logicians focus on psychological experiments and data, natura-
lizing logic, paying attention to empirical data. At the workshop Blackburn’s own work
with computer scientist Torben Bräuner, and psychologist Irina Polyanskaya, on the
abilities of recursive reasoning by children, beautifully exemplifies this line of inquiry.
This work combines the social scientific aspects of psychology (quantitative and quali-
tative interviews, theoretical models of reasoning), with the machinery of hybrid logic
playing the role of a specific reasoning mechanism explaining the phenomena. One
issue with this general approach is what happens to the normative aspect of logic as
a standard of correct reasoning? If you go very naturalistic, this tension will build.
Another tenet of Blackburn’s view is logical pluralism. Now, from his talk, it was not
exactly clear to me what he meant by this term, but if is going to have any bite, it will
have to mean more than simply many logics allowed - Quinean first-order logic funda-
mentalism is hardly a serious position to take these days. However, as is the case with
naturalism, the further we go pluralist, logic loses more and more of its claim to be fo-
undational, a role which I suppose Blackburn still wishes to ascribe to logic, assuming
that logic is part of the new trivium referred to in the title of the talk, and that this new
trivium will play a role similar, if updated, to that of its medieval counterpart. Towards
the end of the talk, Blackburn restated the claim that the next great insights in logic
may come from a return to the humanities. Even to the extent of getting insights from
schools of thought seemingly quite foreign to logic, such as deconstructivism and soci-
al constructivism. In the discussion following the talk, Vincent Hendricks, University
of Copenhagen, laconically pointed out that this would require that the humanities got
interested in what logic has to offer. This remark points to something deeper than the
attitudes to logic of individual researchers, i.e. a number of more or less conscious and
intended splits in the history of philosophy away from logic. To start in Denmark, one
can mention Kierkegaard’s dismissal of the logical aspects of Hegel, and moving on,
Nietzsche’s dismissal of Kant (and almost anything else, certainly anything formal),
Heidegger’s negligence of the logical aspects of his two great sources of inspiration,
Aristotle and Husserl, the latter Wittgenstein’s ambiguous relationship to his younger
self, the social constructivists failure to take up Kuhn’s challenge of providing a theory
of meaning befitting of paradigm theory. Although these splits by no means constitute
an impenetrable wall between logic and other parts of philosophy, and although the-
re are exceptions to the rule to be stated next, a major part of the philosophy upon
which current humanities thinking is based is not just alogical, but anti-logical in its
foundations. This goes for new left critical philosophy, existentialism, major parts of
social constructivism (focus on the unformalizable complexity of individual case stu-
dies, and so on), and for mainstream thought experiment driven analytic philosophy
(although to a much lesser extent now than when I started as a student 20 years ago).
This should not be taken to mean that I disagree with Blackburn. Just considering the
German tradition, I think there are important insights to be gained from Heidegger,
Gadamer, the later Wittgenstein and others. Martin Stokhof, University of Amsterdam,
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has pointed this out in several publications as well as showed us what kind of specific
historical analyses of e.g. logical form could be fruitful. However, it remains an open
question how these insights can be transferred into actual formal work, e.g. as done
by Sonja Smets. Blackburn did not provide an answer, nor was he required to. One
obvious answer, which I think has only been partly successful, we might dub rational
reconstruction. We have seen a lot of this kind of work, Blackburn, Bräuner, and Poly-
anskaya’s work in cognitive science is of this nature. In the same line, we can imagine
a logical formalization of aspects of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit or of Gadamer’s histo-
rical analyses. However, whereas such efforts widen the scope of logic, which has a lot
of value, they do in my view not tend to significantly deepen our understanding of logic
itself. The logical paradigm is usually presupposed or only changed incrementally in
order to fit the application area. Again, this is fine and should be considered scientific
progress. But, in my view, if we want to really change the foundations of logic this is
where we should look again: at the foundations of logic. I have no idea at present of
how to proceed so as not to just repeat the work of previous generations, but I suggest
we start looking there - Gödel, Tarski, Turing, Church, Kleene. This does not mean that
we should not look to other traditions, but our own tradition in logic is a treasure trove
of deep philosophical insight, which should not be forgotten, but critically questioned
in the spirit of Patrick Blacburn’s amazingly inspiring talk!
All in all, I think it is safe to say that the CADILLAC workhop was a testemony to
the fact that logic is still very much alive and kicking, also in Scandinvia.
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